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Abstract
The effect of a firm’s uncertainty regarding technological development on the formation of alliances is
examined, and it is shown that this uncertainty is positively related to the number of alliances. However, higher
uncertainty also makes the firm less likely to ally with others if the collected information is redundant. The
higher the similarity between the technological regimes of potential alliance partners, the lower the incentive
to ally. Also direct ties are preferred to indirect ones if uncertainty is high since direct ties yield more accurate
information than indirect ties.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: D83; L10; L20
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1. Introduction
In this paper we will consider some theoretical issues regarding the formation of optimal
networks through inter-firm alliances from the perspective of an individual company. These inter-
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firm alliances are defined as collaborative agreements between independent companies. We will
discuss technology alliances where companies share R&D and other innovative activities through
a range of different collaborative agreements (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). Given the context
of these alliances, the main purpose of these collaborative activities is to learn about a particular
new technology and to reduce the uncertainty surrounding this new technology.
In this paper we address three topics. The first issue concerns how many alliances a firm
will form in order to counter uncertainty. We determine the optimal number of alliances for a
particular firm (i.e., the focal firm) when each alliance yields an observation on an uncertain
technology or competence, using a Bayesian learning framework (cf. Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961;
DeGroot, 1970).1 We find that a higher degree of technological uncertainty necessitates a higher
number of alliances. Furthermore, we assume that contacts or ties are partly redundant. In that
case, technological information obtained from various sources is, to some extent, similar. In other
words, the firms that may potentially ally with the focal firm share a common technological regime
(cf. Nelson and Winter, 1977; Dosi, 1982). We study how this technological commonality affects
the incentive to form alliances, and we find that a higher degree of commonality reduces the
incentive to form alliances.
Second, according to the standard efficiency approach in network analysis (Burt, 1992a,b) it is
the number of non-redundant contacts that counts. Companies should limit getting involved with
networks where contacts are duplicated. We consider how uncertainty affects the incentive to form
either redundant or non-redundant ties. We argue that non-redundant ties yield better information
to the firm, though they might be costlier to obtain. In fact, firms that already belong to the network
in which a firm participates are usually less costly allies to develop because trust between the
members facilitates further alliances (Gulati, 1995b; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Saxton, 1997). The
cost of searching for new alliances within the existing network is lower as well (Gomes-Casseres,
1996; Gulati, 1995a; Uzzi, 1997). However, the disadvantage of such ties is that members of
an existing network progressively become less attractive candidates to form an alliance with
because the information they yield is similar. We show that under higher uncertainty the choice
for redundant contacts becomes less likely.
Thirdly, standard network theory argues that ‘weak ties’ or ‘bridge ties’ are beneficial in
transmitting information from one group of social players to another (Granovetter, 1973; Burt,
1992a,b). Hence, these ties allow a firm to obtain information from a source to which it is not
connected directly. The main argument is that firms should aim at forming efficient networks by
means of a limited number of direct ties that act as bridges to indirectly connected companies.
The assumption here is that direct ties may be substituted for indirect ties. However, the extent to
which this is possible may be limited if the merits of direct and indirect ties differ. In particular
Ahuja (2000) argues that indirect ties yield only information that is easily communicated. This
information can provide only a rather noisy signal of the knowledge present at the indirect link.
Direct ties also allow for transmission of tacit and non-codifiable information. Hence, direct ties
provide a more accurate signal of the competences available at the direct link. We show, in line
with the ‘closure’ argument by Coleman (1988), that under higher uncertainty the choice for direct
contacts becomes more likely in order to improve the communication between the ties.
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section we provide a general outline of the
optimisation problem of a firm. In the second section, we investigate under which conditions it
1 The results of these models have been interpreted in the context of alliance formation by Mody (1993) who argues that
firms reduce uncertainty by learning through alliances: during each period an alliance exists, an experiment is conducted
that yields an observation on the desirability of breaking up, continuing or merging.
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becomes more important to form non-redundant ties. In the third section, we discuss the conditions
determining when information obtained from indirect ties is dominated by information from direct
ties. We draw conclusions and provide directions for future research in the final section.
2. A Bayesian model of information collection through forming alliances
This section presents an outline of the optimisation problem from the perspective of the man-
agement of a single, representative firm that is interested in information gathering about product
or process innovation through alliances (see also Arora and Gambardella, 1994). The basic idea
behind the model is that a firm is uncertain about the future direction in which important elements
of its technology will develop.2 To reduce this uncertainty surrounding technological innovation,
the firm can form alliances with other firms to acquire useful information. In the following we
adopt a Bayesian two-stage learning model as developed by, among others, Raiffa and Schlaifer
(1961) and DeGroot (1970).3 In the first stage, the firm decides on the number of its alliances.
In the second stage, it decides about the direction of the technology it implements. To develop
some notation, consider a firm that is uncertain about important aspects of its future technology
or its main competences. Suppose that the desired future direction of the firm’s technology is
reflected by a parameter T of which the value is unknown and outside the control of the firm.
The uncertainty about the value of T is represented by a probability density function (pdf). The
technological direction ultimately chosen by the firm is given by the decision parameter d. The
firm has some prior expectations about the variable T, which are derived from information already
available. This means that the firm has some notion of the expected direction and degree of uncer-
tainty surrounding technological developments. We formalize this idea by assuming that before
the firm forms any alliance, the prior distribution of T is normal with mean μ and variance σ2T :
T ∼ N(μ, σ2T ). (1)
It is costly to choose a technology deviating from the desired one. Hence, the firm incurs a cost
if the direction d does not match the desired direction given by T. In this study the costs when
choosing direction d are given by4
C(T, d) = a|T − d|, a > 0. (2)
The idea is that the costs are influenced by the extent to which the direction d chosen by the firm
fits with the desired technology represented by the variable T. The firm minimizes the expected
value of C(T,d) by choosing dopt. This means that dopt is determined by
min
d
E
T
C(T, d), (3)
where E denotes that expectations are taken with respect to T. If T is known with certainty, it
is obviously optimal to select d = T. However, T is assumed to be unknown, and the uncertainty
about its value is represented by a prior probability distribution function as given by Eq. (1).
The firm does not need to fix d immediately. In fact, it has the opportunity to collect information
about the properties of T by forming alliances with other firms. Before we develop the model in
2 Instead of using the concept of technology one could also think of a firm’s core competences.
3 Parts of this section are closely related to Cukierman (1980). In our model the parameter n reflects the number of
alliances the firm selects. Cukierman interprets n as the optimal number of periods a firm may collect observations of x.
4 A quadratic cost function could be used as an alternative.
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detail, we will first provide an informal example of the information acquisition process by means
of alliance formation. Consider the period from the mid-1970s to the 1980s, when traditional
pharmaceutical companies such as Johnson & Johnson, Smithkline Beecham, and Hoffmann-La
Roche entered into R&D alliances, mostly R&D contracts, with a group of new biotechnology
companies that all specialized in revolutionary new technologies based on genetic engineering and
cell fusion that could potentially transform completely the way in which pharmaceutical products
were developed and which were unrelated to the traditional technologies pharmaceutical firms
mastered.5 Such developments caused a high level of uncertainty regarding future technologies
or competences for the large pharmaceutical firms, as represented by T in our model. Existing
pharmaceutical technology was based on organic chemistry and random mass screening of chem-
ical compounds, whereas biotechnology, developed by this group of new companies, shared a
body of knowledge based on immunology, molecular biology, and DNA technology. In search
for these new technologies Johnson & Johnson teamed up with Enzo-Biochem, Chiron, Amgen,
Integrated-Genetics, International Clinical Laboratories, Immunomedics, and British Biotech.
Smithkline Beecham entered into R&D alliances with Cetus, Immunex, British Biotech, Applied
Immunesciences, Cambridge Bioscience, Reckitt & Colman, and Biogen. Hoffmann-La Roche
formed alliances with Genentec, Damon Biotech, Cetus, Genzyme, Xoma, Biodor, and Synergen.
We consider the following situation: each time the firm sets up an alliance with another firm,
it receives information by observing the realization of a random variable xi. We assume that
xi = yi + ε, which means that each time information is acquired, it is based on two different inde-
pendently distributed components: an idiosyncratic component yi and a common component ε.
These two components can be motivated as follows. First, since each potential alliance partner is
different due to firm specific resources (Barney, 1991, 2001; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996;
Madhok and Tallman, 1998), each alliance yields some unique information represented here by yi.
For instance, the small biotechnology firms mentioned previously all specialized in a few projects
and product applications because of a limited amount of resources. Therefore, they all build firm
specific knowledge bases (Roijakkers et al., 2005), for example Chiron initially concentrated
on genetically engineered vaccines for hepatitis, Enzo-Biochem on gene and immune regulation
and gene editing, Immunomedics on monoclonal anti-body based products, Cetus on multiplying
DNA sequences, Biogen on recombinant alpha interferon, Genzyme on various immune diseases,
and Xoma on cell expression technology for the production of recombinant proteins. Given the
different knowledge bases of different partners, the first information component yi generated by
an alliance does not resemble information obtained from other alliances. In other words, this
means in statistical terms that this piece of information is uncorrelated with that obtained from
other potential alliance partners. In fact, the first variable yi varies with each alliance formed by
the firm. It is independently and identically normally distributed with y ∼ N(Ey, σ2y ).
Second, the potential partners belong to a group of similar firms in the sense that they do
share a common base of knowledge, as found for instance in common technological regimes
(Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 1977). In our setup the random variable ε accounts for the
common base of knowledge. The implication of a common technological knowledge base is
that information derived from different firms that are members of a certain industry will also
show some overlap. For instance, Powell et al. (1996) suggest the presence of a certain degree
of overlap in the academic culture and scientific and technological knowledge base of the new
biotechnology companies in the 1970s and 1980s. Hence, to some extent the knowledge sets
5 This information is drawn from the MERIT-CATI database on inter-firm R&D alliances.
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of these biotechnology firms showed some degree of similarity because they were all based on
immunology, molecular biology and DNA technology. To capture the presence of this kind of
overlap, we assume that alliances also yield a second information component that is identical
across partnerships. Hence, all observations xi share a common component given by the second
stochastic term ε, which does not change with the alliances formed. It has a normal distribution
ε ∼ N(Eε, σ2ε ).6
Next, we assume that the expected value of xi which is given by Ex = Ey + Eε, equals Ex = T.7
Hence, the desired future direction of the technology T is the mean of the normally distributed
variable x. As a consequence, if the firm obtains an observation x, this yields some information
about T. Note that the firm can only observe the sum of yi and ε. It does not identify these two
terms separately. The variances of the two components of xi (i.e., yi and ε) are assumed to be
given and known. The total variance of xi is given by σ2y + σ2ε . The lower this variance, the higher
the precision will be of the firm’s estimate of the future desired technology T. The variances σ2ε
and σ2y are present for several reasons. First, the partner firm may lack the ability or the incentives
to transmit its information without ambiguity. For instance, knowledge may be tacit and hence
inherently difficult to communicate to individuals not familiar with the organization in which
the information is embedded (Howells, 1996). Furthermore, a firm may want to protect crucial
elements of its knowledge base and only release parts of it (Arora, 1995; Poppo and Zenger, 2002;
Ring, 2002).8 Second, information obtained from a partner may lack clarity due to an insufficient
learning capability of the firm that decides about the optimal number of partners. A firm needs
a certain absorptive capacity to be able to evaluate and utilize information properly (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990). Third, the partner firm may be uncertain itself about the precise value of the
future technology. Hence, the total variance σ2y + σ2ε may reflect its own degree of uncertainty
regarding the value of T.
The above three concerns may be different for the two variables ε and y. Furthermore, σ2y and
σ2ε may differ for the following reason. Consider a large pharmaceutical company in the 1980s
that wishes to obtain competences in biotechnology. As explained above, new biotechnology
knowledge was largely developed within a group of new companies that shared a general basic
knowledge developed from core technologies such as DNA synthesising and sequencing, and
cell fusion methodologies for producing hybridomas (see also Powell et al., 1996, p. 122). Such
core technologies refer to the type of knowledge we consider to be common among the potential
partners, which is formalised by the variable ε in our model. However, for the actual development
of new projects and specific technologies, nearly all of these small biotechnology firms could
specialize only in particular sub-disciplines and concentrate on one or a few research projects
and product applications, thereby developing firm specific knowledge that is captured by the
6 In our model information obtained by an alliance is based on some knowledge that is shared (common) among the
potential partners. The notion of ‘common’ only refers to the part of information that is similar among the potential
partners of the firm. It is not information that is publicly available to firms outside the set of potential partner firms. Hence,
to the firm that determines its optimal number of partners this information is new in our model. This assumption can be
relaxed. We will discuss this matter in the final paragraph of this section, where we argue that our findings still hold if the
focal firm has already obtained information from prior alliances with the same common knowledge component.
7 This assumption does not affect our main findings. One may also assume that Ey = T(0) and Eε = 0(T). It is important
that the sum of Ey and Eε, which determine Ex, equals T since the mean of the sum of normally distributed variables is
the sum of the respective means.
8 In our model we assume that strategic motives affect the variance of the signal provided by the partner, but not
the expected value. The precise modelling of strategic manipulation of information applying game theoretic models of
asymmetric information is beyond the scope of this study.
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random term yi (Roijakkers et al., 2005). In this case, for the large pharmaceutical company the
observations xi only partly overlap with each other, since these potential partners (i.e., the small
biotechnology firms) are forced to specialize in particular subfields. Hence, in this example the
variance σ2y is likely to be substantial compared with the variance σ2ε .
Consider now a small biotechnology firm in the same era that lacks competences in areas such
as obtaining financial resources, drug testing, obtaining legal permission to sell a particular drug,
manufacturing or marketing. In this case the parameter T and its statistical properties reflect the
biotechnology firm’s uncertainty on how to commercialize its product for instance. Such compe-
tences are available in large pharmaceutical firms (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). However, with
respect to these competences, it is likely that certain common standards have developed among the
large companies since the industry was relatively mature at that time (Rothaermel, 2001). Hence,
the potential partners for a small biotechnology firm that possess such competences were likely to
provide similar information. In this example the variance of the common knowledge component
σ2ε is likely to be large compared with the variance σ2y in terms of our model. Then information on
the desired competence as given by T is largely determined by a common understanding among
the potential partner firms and not by idiosyncratic knowledge.
If the firm obtains various observations by forming alliances, they contain partly similar infor-
mation. The relative size of σ2y and σ2ε determines the amount of overlap between observations
from different partners. Intuitively, this can be understood as follows. Suppose that the variance
of the common component ε becomes larger relative to σ2y . This implies that it becomes more
likely that the value of y is relatively small compared to the size of ε. In this case the observations
xi are largely determined by the larger (in absolute terms) common component ε. More formally,
this feature is reflected in statistical terms by the degree of correlation of the observations. To see
this consider the n by n covariance matrix Σnx of n observations x1, x2, . . ., xn:
Σnx =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
σ2y + σ2ε σ2ε · σ2ε
σ2ε σ
2
y + σ2ε · ·
· · · σ2ε
σ2ε · σ2ε σ2y + σ2ε
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ . (4)
The correlation coefficient of two different observations xi and xj equals ρi,j = σ2ε /(σ2y + σ2ε ) >
0. Since this expression does not depend on i and j, we drop subscripts and refer to the correlation
coefficient ρ ≡ ρi,j in the rest of this paper. It appears that the correlation between xi and xj
increases with the variance σ2ε and decreases with the variance σ2y . Hence, if the variance of ε is
high relative to that of y, the information carried by the variable x will largely be influenced by
the informational content of ε. Therefore, if the variance σ2ε is high compared to the variance σ2y ,
the two observations xi and xj will both be highly affected by the presence of similar information
among the potential partner firms and much less by the alliance specific information (i.e., yi),
implying a high coefficient of correlation. Hence, in our model it is not the absolute size of σ2ε
that determines the strength of the technological regime within the group of potential alliance
partners. It is the relative size of σ2ε with respect to σ2y .9
9 One could also argue that a strong technological regime reflects a situation in a mature industry where for instance
firms have converged to similar competences that they master with high precision. However, for an industry outsider that
wants access to such capabilities by forming alliances, information obtained from such sources may, as explained before,
be surrounded with considerable uncertainty due to ambiguity in the information transmission or a limited absorptive
182 W. Letterie et al. / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 66 (2008) 176–194
Information becomes available at a cost, which represents the cost of setting up an alliance
and the cost of collecting and evaluating the information. The total cost per observation of x is
given by c. If the firm decides to observe n values of the variable x before it chooses its direction
d, the firm uses the acquired information to update its knowledge concerning the variable T using
Bayesian learning.10 This knowledge is given by the posterior distribution of T that incorporates
all information that is contained in the observations x1, x2, . . ., xn. The parameters of the prior
pdf (1) are assumed to be given and known. The variance of the random variable x in (4) is also
assumed to be given and known.11
The optimal number of information-gathering alliances before the firm determines its optimal
direction dopt can be determined as follows. The firm chooses n to minimize the expected value
of the cost function C(T,d) presented in equation (2) given the posterior beliefs concerning T and
the cost of collecting information given by nc. Hence, n is found by
C = min
n
(
min
d
E
T,n
C(T, d) + nc
)
. (5)
The n under the expectations operator in Eq. (6) denotes that d is chosen using the posterior
distribution of T after n observations of x. The minimized expected cost the firm incurs equals C. In
order to derive the optimal number of information-gathering alliances, we first need to determine
the firm’s optimal direction dopt using Eqs. (2) and (3). We find that
min
d
E
T,n
C(T, d) = a min
d
E
T,n
|T − d|. (6)
The optimal direction dopt is equal to the median of the distribution of T (DeGroot, 1970,
p. 232). Since the posterior distribution of T is normal and therefore symmetrically distributed
around its mean, the optimal strategy of the firm is given by dopt = μn (i.e., the expected value of
T given its posterior distribution). The minimized value of Eq. (6) is given by (DeGroot, 1970, p.
233)
min
d
E
T,n
C(T, d) = a
√
2σ2n
π
. (6′)
It appears that the expected cost the firm incurs depends on the degree of uncertainty remaining
after n observations as given by σ2n . The higher the uncertainty as measured by σ2n , the higher
the cost. Therefore, the firm has an incentive to reduce the uncertainty it faces. Using Eq. (5) the
firm’s optimisation problem becomes
min
n
⎛
⎝a
√
2σ2n
π
+ nc
⎞
⎠ . (5′)
capacity. The variance σ2ε it perceives may still be relatively high because of this, even though the partner firm faces little
uncertainty regarding its competences.
10 Note that n refers to the number of alliances the firm selects.
11 This assumption could be dropped easily. When the variance of x is unknown, the uncertainty surrounding its value
could be represented by a prior pdf, such as using an inverted gamma pdf (see e.g. Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961).
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The variance of T given its posterior distribution, which incorporates all information x1, x2,
. . ., xn, is given by
σ2n =
(
1
σ2T
+ n
σ2y + nσ2ε
)−1
. (7)
The derivation of this expression is given in the appendix which is available on the JEBO
website. Before proceeding with the optimization problem of the firm let us consider two extreme
cases. First, consider the situation where each partnership provides some alliance specific infor-
mation and information that is similar within the group of potential partner firms. Suppose now
that the variance of common information is very large: σ2ε approaches infinity. Then the poste-
rior variance σ2n equals the variance of the prior distribution σ2T . This means that in this case,
forming alliances does not provide any useful information since the degree of uncertainty faced
by the firm remains equal to its prior degree of uncertainty given by σ2T . The explanation is as
follows. The correlation coefficient between two observations xi and xj (i.e., ρ = σ2ε /(σ2y + σ2ε ))
approaches one in this case. This means that two alliances provide exactly the same information.
Hence, the maximum number of alliances that possibly provides relevant information is one.
However, an observation xi is drawn out of a distribution with a variance that approaches infinity
(σ2x = σ2y + σ2ε ). Therefore the estimate of T based on observation xi is very inaccurate and does
not lead to a reduction of uncertainty as measured by σ2n . Hence, it is optimal to build no alliances.
Second, suppose now that the technological regime within the group of potential partner firms
is strong. This means that information derived from an alliance is compelled by the technological
regime and not by alliance specific information (i.e., yi). In terms of our model, this happens when
σ2y is small relative to σ2ε , because then, as the correlation coefficient ρ indicates, two observations
xi and xj, are highly correlated. Consider the extreme case where the variance of the idiosyncratic
term is zero (i.e., σ2y = 0 and ρ = 1). This implies that information derived from the alliance is
completely based on the shared technological regime. Hence, within the set of potential partners,
information about the technology is exactly the same. Therefore one alliance is enough to acquire
all information available, and the optimal number of alliances is either zero or one, depending on
whether the benefits of an alliance outweigh the cost of establishing a partnership. The posterior
variance of T after observing x is equal to σ2n = ((1/σ2T ) + (1/σ2ε ))
−1
, which is independent of
the number of observations: n. If σ2ε approaches zero, then σ2n becomes zero as well, and the firm
knows the value of T precisely.
Let us now return to the optimization problem faced by the firm. The first and second order
conditions for the optimization of equation (5) become
FOC : −1
2
a
√
2
π
(
1
(σ2y/n) + σ2ε
+ 1
σ2T
)−3/2(
σ2y/n
2
((σ2y/n) + σ2ε )2
)
+ c = 0, (8)
SOC :
1
2
a
√
2
π
(1/(σ2y/n + σ2ε ) + 1/σ2T )
−3/2
(σ2y + nσ2ε )3
×
⎛
⎝3
2
(
1
σ2y/n + σ2ε
+ 1
σ2T
)−1(
σ4y
σ2y + nσ2ε
)
+ 2σ2yσ2ε
⎞
⎠ > 0.
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As all components of the SOC are positive, the second order condition for a minimum is
always satisfied. The FOC depicted above implicitly identifies the optimal number of alliances.12
Unfortunately, it is not possible to derive an explicit expression for the optimal n (taking n as a
continuous variable, in practice one will take the integer value of the optimal value for n resulting
from the optimisation problem). However, in the appendix we derive a number of comparative
static results that we summarize in the following proposition.13
Proposition 1. The optimal number of information gathering alliances, denoted by n,
• decreases with the cost c of setting up an alliance,
• increases with the cost attached to making mistakes as measured by the parameter a,
• increases with the degree of uncertainty the ﬁrm faces as measured by σ2T ,
• decreases with the variance σ2ε of the common random term ε.14
The proposition indicates that the optimal number of alliances decreases with the cost (i.e., c)
of setting up an alliance.15 If the cost associated with making mistakes increases, as measured by
the parameter a, the optimal value of n also increases. It can be seen straightforwardly that the
higher the initial uncertainty as measured by the variance σ2T , the larger the number of alliances
the firm is willing to form. Hence, there exists a relationship between a firm’s incentive to collect
information through alliances and the degree of uncertainty it faces. In classical social network
theory this is referred to as ‘gregariousness’ (Erbe, 1962) where uncertainty is countered by
increasing the number of contacts (i.e., alliances) that will lead to increasing flows of information.
Some recent empirical studies found that under conditions of increasing uncertainty, companies
use large numbers of alliances to improve their learning and information collection capability.
These empirical findings refer to a variety of high-tech industries such as semiconductors (Gomes-
Casseres, 1996), data processing (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002) and biotechnology (Powell et
al., 1996; Walker et al., 1997).
The fourth result should be interpreted as follows. We noted before that ρ = σ2ε /(σ2y + σ2ε ).
Hence, the correlation between xi and xj increases with the variance σ2ε . This means that if the
informational content of the various observations gathered by forming alliances becomes more
similar, the optimal number of alliances decreases. In other words, the firm is less likely to form
a multitude of alliances if these alliances yield more similar information and therefore have a
higher degree of redundancy. Hence, in case the partner firms share a common technological
regime the incentive to form alliances is reduced.16 This line of thought refers to the current
efficiency approach in network analysis (Burt, 1992a,b) which stresses that the size of a specific
12 Note that if we substitute σ2ε = 0 in the FOC depicted in Eq. (8) and solve for n, we obtain the well-known optimisation
problem as studied by Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961), DeGroot (1970) and Cukierman (1980). The SOC guarantees optimality
of this case as well.
13 Our results would not be affected if instead of assuming that an observation xi is the sum of two stochastic variables,
an idiosyncratic component yi and a common component ε, we assume that xi is normally distributed with mean T and
variance σ2x and that two variables xi and xj (i = j) have a covariance equal to ρσ2x where ρ is the positive correlation
coefficient between xi and xj. Note that ρ = cov(xi, xj)/σ2x . In the appendix we consider this case.
14 In line with our previous footnote we could also rephrase this statement by saying that the optimal number of alliances
decreases if the correlation coefficient ρ of the variables xi and xj (i = j) increases.
15 While the first result of Proposition 1 is in line with Mody’s finding, we do not account for uncertainty to increase the
possibility of opportunistic behaviour and hence the perceived costs of an alliance, which tend to reduce alliance activity.
16 The correlation coefficient of the signals obtained from partners that possess competences in technologies that are in an
early stage is likely to be low. Then the incentive to form alliances is high. This is illustrated by the high number of alliances
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network of alliances of a company is not that important for the adequate transfer of information.
What really counts is the number of non-redundant contacts, because it is assumed that redundant
contacts carry the same information. By definition, dense networks involve a considerable degree
of interaction between companies, and many of these interactions are expected to be redundant and
inefficient. In standard network analysis terminology this implies that the structural equivalence
in a network (the degree of interaction with the same group of companies) and the cohesion in
networks (the connectivity of companies) should be limited to benefit from its contacts (see also
Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982). Therefore, a company should avoid duplication of contacts, it should
create well-informed and selective linkages that generate so-called structural autonomy and that
exercise control over rewarding opportunities (i.e., the structural equivalence in its network should
be small). According to for example Burt (1992a), the lower the number of structural equivalent
partners that a firm faces, the more effective a firm’s portfolio of alliances is (see also Lorrain and
White, 1971). Section 2 provides a more detailed illustration of this issue.
Thus far we have assumed in our model that the information acquired by the alliances does not
correlate with knowledge the focal firm already has. This assumption can be relaxed as follows. We
can assume that the focal firm has already established m alliances previously yielding observations
xi = yi + εwith the same properties as we adopted above. Using this information the firm will update
its beliefs concerning T by forming a posterior distribution using the m observations as we have
depicted in this section and the appendix. Next the firm may decide upon additional alliances,
providing observations xi = yi + ε, which are correlated with them previous ones. This decision will
be based on the new posterior distribution of T that incorporates the information of m observations
obtained previously and the new observations. Cukierman (1980, p. 469) observes that using such
a sequential decision procedure instead does not affect the optimal number of observations n.17
If we adjust our model along these lines, we would obtain results consistent with Proposition 1.
For instance, if new observations are more correlated with the m previous ones or if uncertainty
decreases, the optimal number of additional observations decreases.
3. When does non-redundancy become important?
In the above, we considered the case where all observations have part of the information in
common as these observations are correlated. In other words they share a common knowledge base.
Now, we introduce a simple framework in which the firm may choose to acquire observations
that are either correlated or uncorrelated with previous ones. Hence, we discuss under which
conditions firms should try to avoid duplication of information through alliances.
Suppose now that two networks of firms exist, which we denote by networks A and B. Observa-
tions obtained from alliances with companies that belong to network A are given by xi = yi + εA. As
in the previous section the variable yi varies with each alliance formed by the firm and is indepen-
dent across different firms. It is identically normally distributed with y ∼ N(Ey, σ2y ) with variance
assumed to be given and known. The observations xi share a common term εA, which does not
change with the alliances formed within network A. It has a normal distribution εA ∼ N(Eε, σ2ε )
with biotechnology firms established by large pharmaceutical companies as discussed before (see also Roijakkers et al.,
2005). The correlation coefficient is probably higher if observations stem from firms operating in industries with mature
technologies. Then the added value of new alliances with firms from the same group is lower, which is consistent with the
observation that companies in industries like heavy electrical equipment, basic chemicals and food and beverages, which
are relatively mature and technologically less turbulent, establish few partnerships (Hagedoorn, 1995).
17 In fact, we adopt a sequential decision procedure in the next section.
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with variance assumed to be given and known. This assumption implies that observations within a
certain network are correlated and hence show some overlap. Support for this assumption is found
in Gomes-Casseres (1996) and Uzzi (1997) who found that within a network of interacting firms,
knowledge across the constituents will become similar. To keep the model tractable we do not
formally derive how information becomes similar within a network. Network B is very similar in
the sense that observations provided by firms that make up the group are given by xi = yi + εB and
the variable yi varies independently with each alliance formed by the firm. For the sake of con-
venience we assume it is also identically normally distributed with y ∼ N(Ey, σ2y ). The common
component of the observations xi in network B is εB, which has a normal distribution N(Eε, σ2ε )
as well to facilitate the discussion. We assume again that Ey + Eε = T. The stochastic terms εA and
εB are assumed to be independent. Hence, if observations are obtained from firms that belong
to different networks, they do not show any overlap. In statistical terms, these observations are
not correlated. Furthermore, we presume that the variances of the stochastic terms εA and εB are
equal. This assumption could be dropped. In fact the degree of precision of the information avail-
able within networks A and B may depend on the size and structure of the networks. However,
for convenience and without affecting the main conclusions of our study, we do not consider this
possibility.
Suppose now that the firm has already formed an alliance with a firm in network A.18 The firm
now belongs to network A and has access to information derived from the technological regime
that is present in network A. Information derived from its alliance with a firm in network A is
optimally included in its knowledge base by Bayesian learning. The firm we consider and the
firms in network A have become similar to some extent in terms of their knowledge bases. In fact,
an additional alliance with a firm from network A will yield information that partly overlaps with
the information it already possesses (i.e., a new observation is correlated with an observation it
already obtained). However, an alliance with a firm from network B will not show any overlap
with its knowledge base (i.e., an observation from network B is not correlated with its observation
from network A). Hence, our firm may build an alliance with a firm that is similar (from network
A) or with a firm that is dissimilar (from network B) in terms of its knowledge base.
Consider now the firm’s decision of setting up an alliance with another firm from either networks
A or B. Using the result depicted in Eq. (7) the variance of T after two observations from network
A is given by
σ2AA =
(
1
σ2T
+ 2
σ2y + 2σ2ε
)−1
. (9)
If the firm chooses to cooperate with a firm from network B, the variance of each observation
will be equal to σ2x = σ2y + σ2ε . Furthermore, the observations from the two different networks A
and B are independent. Therefore, we find, in line with Section 1, that after two observations the
posterior variance of the variable T becomes19:
σ2AB =
(
1
σ2T
+ 2
σ2y + σ2ε
)−1
. (10)
18 The results derived in this section still apply if we assume the focal firm has already established m alliances previously
with firms from network A.
19 To see this use Eq. (7) and fill in n = 2, σ2ε = 0 and σ2y = σ2y + σ2ε .
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The cost of forming an alliance with an additional company from network A is denoted cA. If
the firm chooses a partner from network B the cost is given by cB. One may argue that the cost
cB is larger than cA. For instance, once alliances have been established within a network, trust
between the members may facilitate further alliances as found by Gulati (1995b), Nooteboom et
al. (1997) and Saxton (1997). Also, the cost of searching for new useful partners may be lower
within the existing network (Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Gulati, 1995a; Uzzi, 1997).
However, as indicated in the above, companies might have an advantage in forming alliances
with companies from network B. Let σ2A denote the variance of the predictor of T after one
observation of a firm out of network A. The firm will choose a firm from network B if the
marginal benefit of adding a network B observation is higher than the marginal benefit from
additional information from network A:
−a
⎛
⎝
√
2σ2AB
π
−
√
2σ2A
π
⎞
⎠− cB > −a
⎛
⎝
√
2σ2AA
π
−
√
2σ2A
π
⎞
⎠− cA. (11)
Since σ2AA > σ2AB the inequality of Eq. (11) will hold if the cost of setting up an alliance with
a firm from B is relatively low. Furthermore, if the degree of uncertainty (i.e., σ2T ) faced by the
firm is larger, Eq. (11) is also more likely to hold, because
∂(−
√
2σ2AB/π +
√
2σ2AA/π)
∂σ2T
> 0. (12)
This leads to our second proposition.
Proposition 2. If the environment faced by the ﬁrm is becoming more uncertain, as measured
by σ2T , the ﬁrm is likely to avoid duplication of information through alliances within its existing
network.20
Within the context of our model, assuming higher uncertainty, firms that are members of the
existing network (here network A) gradually become less attractive allies because they actually
yield similar information. Hence, members of other networks to which the firm has no contacts
yet become more appealing candidates to ally with. To illustrate this, a recent empirical study
of a very volatile environment by Roijakkers and Hagedoorn (2006) shows that up to the 1980s
large pharmaceutical companies allied with biotechnology companies to obtain competences in
basic research in the fields of cell fusion and genetic engineering. During the 1980s they gradually
changed to forming R&D alliances with less emphasis on basic research as the main objective of
the alliance. In that context, new R&D partnerships focused more and more on high-risk applied
research and new product development and less on the scanning of new technologies. In their
comparison of different inter-firm R&D networks in pharmaceutical biotechnology over a 25-
year period, Roijakkers and Hagedoorn (2006) also notice that nodal companies, such as Johnson
& Johnson, Smithkline Beecham, and Hoffmann-La Roche, have flexible and changing networks
in which they build new R&D partnerships with a variety of companies. The specific role of many
20 This proposition also holds if the correlation coefficient of two observations derived from networks A and B as
measured by ρAB is positive (rather than zero as in this section) but smaller than the correlation coefficient of two
observations obtained from firms in network A (i.e., ρAA). Using the results we derive in the appendix related to footnote
13 we find that in this case σ2AA = ((1/σ2T) + 2/(σ2x (1 + ρAA)))
−1
and σ2AB = ((1/σ2T) + 2/(σ2x (1 + ρAB)))
−1
. Hence, if
ρAA > ρAB, then σ2AA > σ
2
AB, and all arguments apply again.
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specialized biotechnology firms, as it emerged during the early decades of pharma-biotechnology,
has changed over time. The network of players in pharmaceutical biotechnology in the second
half of the 1990s consists of a very different group of partners, most of them more established
companies with a greater variety of technological skills than those found in the group of dedicated
biotechnology companies that were the alliance candidates of the large pharmaceutical firms in
the 1970s and 1980s.
4. When do direct ties dominate indirect ties?
In this section we present a model to determine when a direct tie, that carrying information
directly from another company, is preferred to an indirect tie where information is based on transfer
from a company in a network through a single bridge tie. Standard social network theory assumes
that it is beneficial for companies to access existing information through a limited number of
direct contacts while avoiding direct links to dense inefficient networks. This line of reasoning is
based on classical arguments such as, for instance, found in Granovetter’s ‘weak ties’ that serve as
bridges that can help to transfer information from one group of social players to another. A similar
argument is made by Burt (1992a,b) where ‘structural holes’ within networks are overarched by
bridge ties with as little redundancy as possible. According to this approach building networks
with many indirect ties is an effective way for a firm to reap the benefits of a large network
without incurring the costs of maintaining a large number of direct ties. However, the assumption
implicitly made is that direct links can be substituted for indirect links. Ahuja (2000) argues that
the possibility to do so may be limited if benefits of direct and indirect links differ in magnitude
and content. He presents an empirical assessment of the effects of direct and indirect ties on a
firm’s ability to innovate: both types of links enhance the performance of a focal firm. However,
he also finds that indirect ties contribute much less than direct links. Therefore, the merits of the
two types of links are different.
To distinguish between these benefits it is useful to define know-how and information. Accord-
ing to Ahuja (2000, p. 428) “Know-how entails accumulated skills and expertise in some activity
and is likely to include a significant tacit and non-codifiable dimension. Information refers primar-
ily to facts, discrete quanta of information that can be transmitted through simple communication
in relatively complete form and without loss of integrity”. Direct links provide access to both
know-how and information available at the partner firm. However, bridge ties can provide access
only to information (knowledge spill-over) concerning knowledge available at the indirect link. In
line with this Gulati and Garguilo (1999) observe that a firm’s partners also bring the knowledge
and experience from their collaboration with their partners to the focal firm. A firm’s partners
therefore provide it with access not only to the knowledge held by its partners but also to the
knowledge of its partner’s partners. Ahuja (2000) indicates that bridge ties may provide infor-
mation for instance on the success or failure of many simultaneous research efforts at indirect
links. This facilitates early detection of promising technological trajectories as well as techno-
logical dead-ends. Such information of developments at indirect links may help a focal firm to
assess the future development of its own core technologies. However, information from an indi-
rect tie does not enable knowledge sharing as with a direct link and hence provides a rather
noisy signal of the knowledge available at the indirect link. Collaboration facilitates exchange of
non-codifiable and tacit information, yielding a more thorough learning process compared with
learning through information obtained concerning technological developments at indirect links.
In this case a more accurate signal is obtained concerning the competences available at the direct
link.
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In our model we consider three firms, and in order to facilitate the discussion, we label them
A–C. At the moment at which firm A considers aligning with just B or with both B and C, the
observations xB and xC that may be provided by these two firms to firm A are both normally
distributed with mean T and variance σ2x .21 However, we assume that firms B and C are work-
ing together already when firm A considers them as potential candidates for an alliance. Due to
the collaboration of firms B and C, these firms have adjusted their competences because of an
exchange of know-how and information as defined above (cf. Ahuja, 2000). Hence, the signals
they may give to firm A concerning T incorporate the knowledge obtained from each other. To
capture that their knowledge bases overlap to a certain extent, we assume the observations xB and
xC are correlated. This aspect of the model reflects the notion that both firm B and C incorporate
the knowledge obtained during their partnership in their own knowledge base and is captured by
the covariance of xB and xC given by σBC. The observations xB and xC may differ even though B
and C have been working together for at least three reasons. First, both firm B and C may also
develop new insights independent from each other, possibly by interacting with other firms not
considered in our model. Second, it is not likely that both B and C have completely revealed their
competences to each other for strategic reasons. Usually firms try to control the knowledge flow
to their partner using, for instance, gatekeepers. Third, both B and C will also try to protect parts
of their knowledge base and limit access by firm A. These arguments also imply that receiving
xB from cooperating with firm B does not render the observation of xC or a signal of it com-
pletely superfluous. We like to note that our model does allow for the possibility that information
obtained from firm C is redundant to some extent. The extent to which xC or its signal that we
discuss in the next paragraph (i.e., zC) are superfluous is measured by the covariance σBC in our
model.
In line with Ahuja (2000) cooperating with B allows exchange of know-how and information
concerning some of the competences available at firm B. Hence, firm A obtains observation xB.
Forming an alliance with firm C yields observation xC, reflecting exchange of know-how and
information as well. However, if firm A cooperates only with firm B, then exchange of know-
how with firm C is impossible. Only some information on promising technological research
projects or failures at firm C will be obtained by allying with firm B since firm C is a direct
link of firm B and thus an indirect tie of firm A. Therefore the alliance with firm B yields a
signal zC of observation xC. It is less precise than xC because the exchange of know-how with
firm C is absent now, which prohibits a thorough learning process concerning the competences
residing in firm C. The value or quality of observation xC will decrease since it is transmitted
through an indirect link (cf. Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Bala and Goyal, 2000). To take account
of such decay we assume that xC will be observed by firm A with an error. Hence, firm A
receives a signal zC = xC + η where η is a transmission error that is normally distributed with
zero mean and variance σ2η and that is not correlated with either xB or xC. Hence, signal zC is
normally distributed with meanT and varianceσ2x + σ2η . The covariance between xB and zC is equal
to σBC.
Suppose now that firm A considers the two following strategies. The first strategy involves the
formation of an alliance with firm B but not with firm C. We assumed that firm B has already
established an alliance with firm C. As a consequence, a signal zC of xC is obtained as well by firm
A if it allies with firm B. As a result, by incurring only cost c the firm obtains two observations:
21 Because of symmetry we could also investigate the situation where firm A considers the choice between aligning with
C, and aligning with both B and C, without affecting any of our conclusions below.
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xB and zC. The covariance matrix of these variables is given by
Σxz =
(
σ2x σBC
σBC σ2x + σ2η
)
. (13)
It is straightforward to show within the present model that alliances also yielding indirect ties
are preferred to those that do not yield any indirect ties at all if no additional costs occur. In
terms of network analysis this implies that a company searches for alliances with other firms
that are also well connected to their own specific networks. As a consequence, a partner com-
pany should ideally be characterized by both a high network centrality and a high betweenness
centrality. This network centrality refers to the number of direct links of a particular com-
pany with other companies. In an information-network the possibility to control the flow of
information between other companies is also dependent on a company’s degree of betweenness
centrality. This refers to the number of times a company is located on the shortest geodesic path
between other companies (Freeman, 1979; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Knoke and Kuklinski,
1982).
The second strategy the firm may pursue is to form direct alliances with both firms B and C.
The advantage of this strategy is that in this case both xB and xC are observed without any error,
but the costs are 2c. The properties of these observations are the same as before. The covariance
matrix of xB and xC is given by
Σxx =
(
σ2x σBC
σBC σ2x
)
. (14)
The cost of observing xB and xC equals 2c. The first strategy is preferred to the second one if22
a
√√√√ 2
π
(
1
σ2T
+ 2σ
2
x + σ2η − 2σBC
σ4x + σ2xσ2η − σ2BC
)−1
− a
√√√√ 2
π
(
1
σ2T
+ 2σ
2
x − 2σBC
σ4x − σ2BC
)−1
− c < 0. (15)
It is straightforward to show that the left hand side of this expression increases with a higher
degree of initial uncertainty (i.e., σ2T ) and increases with a higher degree of transmission ambiguity
(i.e., σ2η). These properties lead to our third proposition.
Proposition 3. Direct ties are preferred to indirect ties if
• the cost of forming alliances (i.e., c) is low,
• the cost of making mistakes as measured by a is high,
• if uncertainty as measured by σ2T is high,
• the degree of transmission ambiguity as measured by σ2η is high.
This implies that with increasing uncertainty a company will expand its number of direct
links to a variety of other companies to improve the accuracy of communication between the
ties, leading to dense networks. This result contradicts the efficiency approach within cur-
rent social network theory, which states that under these conditions companies should aim
at establishing efficient networks by means of a limited number of ties that act as bridges
22 See the appendix.
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to other indirectly connected companies (Burt, 1992a; Rowley et al., 2000). However, our
result is more in line with the ‘closure’ argument of Coleman who states that information
rich dense networks of direct ties are more beneficial to network-actors than sparse networks.
An illustration of this phenomenon is found in the biotechnology sector, which is charac-
terised by a high degree of uncertainty. Many pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies
establish a dense and partly overlapping network with a multitude of well-connected partners
that enables them to learn about interesting opportunities from a wide variety of sources (see
Powell et al., 1996; Walker et al., 1997). In more mature and technologically less turbulent
industries such as in heavy electrical equipment, basic chemicals, and food and beverages,
we find fewer alliances, and inter-firm industry networks are characterized by lower density
than found in sectors such as biotechnology and the more advanced sub-sectors of the infor-
mation technology industry. In industries with less technological uncertainty, there are fewer
multiple alliances between partners over time, and the network is relatively sparse as compa-
nies engage in only a limited number of alliances aimed at gaining access to new information
(Hagedoorn, 1995). Consequently, as the networks in these industries are thin and with fewer
direct ties, the relative importance of indirect ties between companies increases (see also Walker
et al., 1997). Our model explains this fact by revealing that in these examples where tech-
nological uncertainty is low, the incentive to transform an indirect tie into a direct one is
very low.
5. Conclusion
We employ a Bayesian learning model in which a firm obtains information about the desired
future technology by forming alliances with other firms. We find that the number of firms a
company will ally with increases with the degree of uncertainty it faces (cf. Mody, 1993).
In classical social network theory this growth in interaction is referred to as ‘gregariousness’
(Erbe, 1962). However, we also argue that the incentive to form alliances decreases once the
information of possible partners has become somewhat similar. In fact, we find that a firm
is less likely to form many alliances if these different alliances share a common knowledge
base. Such alliances have a higher degree of redundancy. This finding is in line with arguments
advanced by Burt (1992a,b), who argues that the number of non-redundant contacts matters.
Furthermore, our paper indicates that under higher uncertainty, redundant contacts become
less attractive partners. If the information these contacts yield is very similar, even if such
alliances are less costly to form, a firm will prefer non-redundant ties. Members of networks
to which the firm has no ties yet and possess non-redundant information become appealing part-
ners. Standard social network theory predicts that companies should establish efficient networks
characterised by a limited number of contacts that form ties to other indirectly connected com-
panies. However, our model indicates that with higher uncertainty, direct contacts, yielding more
accurate information than indirect ties, become more attractive. This ultimately leads to dense
networks.
Our model employs a number of specific assumptions. Hence, several extensions of the anal-
ysis are worth investigating, but they are beyond the scope of the present paper. First, our model
discusses the optimisation problem from the point of view of a single firm. A next step is to
extend our model to account for the fact that stable links require approval of all participants
involved (cf. Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). Second, we assume key parameters to be given and
known to the management of the firm. This can be replaced by an assumption that the uncer-
tainty regarding these parameters can be represented by some prior probability density function.
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Third, in Section 1 we assume that information obtained from alliances is similar. This degree
of similarity is determined exogenously. An extension of the model could account for endogene-
ity, different technologies and strategic (learning) behaviour of companies. Such an extended
model could use other functional forms for the objective function, for instance by allowing for
increasing costs of managing a network, and it could include other motives than collecting infor-
mation for network formation (e.g. joint projects). Fourth, we assume that firms learn about one
single technology as given by a variable T. The model can be easily extended to allow for learn-
ing about various aspects of technology and other matters of interest to the firm, by assuming
T and x (i.e., the observation on the technology) to be vectors of values. A formal analysis of
such extensions can be found in Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961) or in Zellner (1971). Fifth, one
could allow for heterogeneity among potential participants in an alliance. For instance, if the
most valued information provider is a rival firm, which has the lowest incentive to share its
information, the costs of forming an alliance will be high. This case could be dealt with by differ-
entiating the cost structure on the basis of prior expectations about the value of the information
obtained.
It is also interesting to extend our line of modelling into some empirical models, testing major
elements of the above in alternative empirical settings such as industries characterised by different
levels of technological development. In that context the use of a combination of existing network
indicators, derived from current social network analysis, and the development of new network
measures seems both appropriate and necessary to expand this line of work further.
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